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Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been
intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of some features,
such as the synchronicity of the updating, the clustering of the network or the influence of the update
rule. This has been done, however, for concrete settings with particular games, networks and update
rules, with the consequence that some contradictions have arisen and a general understanding of
these topics is missing in the broader context of the space of 2× 2 games. To address this issue, we
have performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the
problem. In some cases, we generalize previous knowledge to the broader context of our study and
explain the apparent contradictions. In other cases, however, our conclusions refute what seems to
be established opinions in the field, as for example the robustness of the effect of spatial structure
against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g. the relation between
the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a key force in evolution, present in all
scales of organization, from unicellular organisms to com-
plex modern human societies [1]. For this reason the
elucidation of the emergence and stabilization of coop-
erative behavior has become a core problem in biology,
economics and sociology [2]. Evolutionary game theory
has proven to be one of the most fruitful approaches to in-
vestigate this problem, using evolutionary models based
on so-called social dilemmas [3, 4]. Several mechanisms
have been proposed to explain the appearance and sur-
vival of cooperation [5], the structure of the population
being one of them, which in this context is also referred
to as “network reciprocity”. The presence of structure
means that each individual does not interact with every
other, but with a small subset of the population, which
constitutes her neighborhood and is arranged according
to an underlying network of relationships. This idea was
very successfully introduced by Nowak and May in their
seminal paper [6], stimulating a wealth of work that con-
tinues to date (see [7] for a review).
The current view on the influence of spatial structure,
as a particular case of population structure, is that in
general it promotes cooperation, given the positive ef-
fects reported on [6] on the most demanding 2× 2 game,
namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma [8]. Many other mod-
els have confirmed this beneficial effect [7], with the only
exception of anti-coordination games such as Hawk-Dove
or Snowdrift games [9]. Most studies, however, have con-
centrated on the Prisoner’s Dilemma [6, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], and the effect
of spatial structure on other games has received much
less attention, as is shown by the much smaller num-
ber of studies on Snowdrift [9, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29] and
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specially on Stag Hunt games [30, 31, 32] (these lists
of references are by no means exhaustive; we refer the
interested reader to the review [7] and also to the supple-
mentary material of [33]). The importance of considering
other kind of games besides Prisoner’s Dilemma should
not be underestimated, as they may be essential in bio-
logical or economic applications. Moreover, it has been
recently shown [34] that, if the game itself is subject to
evolutionary forces, Stag Hunt games may be of special
relevance. Besides this, previous research has made use
of a variety of rules for the update of strategies, com-
bined with different network topologies, with the result
that it is currently impossible to discern for most cases
whether the reported effects on the evolutionary outcome
are caused by the population structure, the update rule
or the combination of both.
To provide a comprehensive picture of this issue, we
have performed a thorough and systematic computa-
tional study, taking into account the most important
symmetric 2 × 2 games and update rules on a number
of degree-homogeneous network models, including two-
dimensional regular lattices, which are by far the most
prototypical models for spatially extended populations.
The reader should note that there have been previous
attempts at achieving the same goal, the most promi-
nent among which is a work by Hauert [35]. Despite the
virtues of this paper, we consider that two important
shortcomings render it a preliminary and inconclusive
attempt: (1) The results reported in [35] for stochas-
tic update rules are not accurate, because the time of
convergence is more than one order of magnitude smaller
than the minimum required for the system, given its size,
to reach a stationary state (see Appendix); and (2) the
effect of spatial structure is evaluated comparing with
a well-mixed population, which makes it impossible to
discern if the influence under study is due to the spa-
tial distribution of neighbors or just to the mere context
preservation [18] of a degree-homogeneous random net-
work (this distinction is crucial, as it reveals the role of
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2the clustering coefficient in spatial networks that we will
show in Sec. IV). In contrast, to assess the influence of
a given spatial structure we have compared the results
not only with the unstructured (i.e. well-mixed) popula-
tion, but also with the homogeneous random population
of the same degree, and we have introduced a quantita-
tive measure for the cooperation achieved on each kind of
game. In addition, we have considered in detail the time
evolution, both under synchronous and asynchronous up-
date schemes, in order to understand the fundamental
dynamical mechanisms involved, and we have addressed
the issue of the influence of selection pressure.
As a result of this exhaustive study we have reached a
number of conclusions that must be put in the context
of previous research. In some cases, these are general-
izations of known results to wider sets of games and up-
date rules, as for example for the issue of the synchrony
of the updating of strategies [6, 10, 11, 27, 28, 32, 36]
or the effect of small-world networks vs regular lattices
[17, 28, 37, 38]. In other cases, the more general view of
our analysis allows to integrate apparently contradictory
results in the literature, as the cooperation on Prisoner’s
Dilemma vs. Snowdrift games [6, 9, 25, 26, 28], or the
importance of clustering in spatial lattices [18, 22, 28].
Other conclusions of ours, however, refute what seems to
be established opinions in the field, as the alleged robust-
ness of the positive influence of spatial structure on Pris-
oner’s Dilemma [6, 10, 35]. And finally, we have reached
additional conclusions, such as the robustness of the in-
fluence of spatial structure on coordination games, and
the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed
equilibria (coordination and anti-coordination games)
and how it varies with the intensity of selection.
In Sec. II we give the background in evolutionary game
theory relevant to our work, introducing symmetric 2×2
games and several evolutionary rules for the update of
strategies. Section III recalls some results in the liter-
ature, highlighting the unresolved questions that moti-
vated this study. In Sec. IV we present our results about
the influence of spatial structure on the evolution of co-
operation, addressing these questions and detailing our
conclusions on the topic. Subsequently, Sec. V deals
with the basic mechanisms that underlie the influence
of spatial structure. Finally, Sec. VI concludes the paper
summarizing our most important points and giving some
additional remarks. One Appendix is included, which
describes the technicalities of the computer simulations.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
Let us consider a symmetric 2× 2 game, a game with
two players who choose between two strategies and with
no difference in role. Each player obtains a payoff given
by the following matrix
C D
C
D
(
1 S
T 0
)
.
(1)
The rows represent the strategy of the player who obtains
the payoff and the columns that of her opponent. We will
come back to this choice of parameters at the end of this
Section, after introducing the evolutionary rules.
The strategies are labeled C and D for cooperate
and defect, because we interpret the game as a social
dilemma. Indeed, certain values of S and T undermine
a hypothetical situation of mutual cooperation. If S < 0
a cooperator faces the risk of losing if the other player
defects, performing worse than with mutual defection. If
T > 1 a cooperator has the temptation to defect and
obtain a payoff larger than that of mutual cooperation.
Both tensions determine the social dilemmas represented
by symmetric 2× 2 games [39]. Restricting the values of
the coefficients within the intervals −1 < S < 1 and
0 < T < 2, we have the Harmony game [40] (0 <
S, T < 1) and three classic social dilemmas: the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma [8] (−1 < S < 0, 1 < T < 2), the Stag
Hunt game [41] (−1 < S < 0 < T < 1), and the Hawk-
Dove [42] or Snowdrift game [43] (0 < S < 1 < T < 2).
Each game corresponds, thus, to a unit square in the
ST -plane.
There is experimental evidence of interactions that ba-
sically correspond to the above stylized games. In gen-
eral, Prisoner’s Dilemmas or Snowdrift games are more
frequently found in the dominance or co-existence among
different traits or species in biological contexts [44, 45],
whereas Stag Hunt games are more related to the prob-
lem of coordination or equilibrium selection from an eco-
nomical viewpoint [46]. We refer the interested reader to
the list of references of [45] for the former case and to
[47] for the latter.
To study the competition between cooperation and
defection from an evolutionary perspective, the payoffs
obtained by playing the game are considered as fitness
[3] and a Darwinian dynamics is introduced to promote
the fittest strategy. The classic framework to do so is
the replicator dynamics [48, 49], which assumes an infi-
nite and well-mixed population, i.e. a population with no
structure, where each individual plays with every other.
Let x be the density of cooperators, and fc and fd the
fitness of a cooperator and a defector, respectively. The
replicator dynamics posits that x evolves as [48]
x˙ = x(1− x)(fc − fd). (2)
Then, if cooperators are doing better than defectors their
density rises accordingly, and the opposite occurs if they
are doing worse. Provided that the initial density of co-
operators x0 is different from 0 and 1, the asymptotic
state of this dynamical system is, for each game (x∗ rep-
resents the asymptotic density of cooperators) [48]: Har-
mony, full cooperation, x∗ = 1; Prisoner’s Dilemma, full
defection, x∗ = 0; Stag Hunt, full cooperation if x0 > xe,
or full defection if x0 < xe; Snowdrift, mixed population
with x∗ = xe, regardless of the initial density x0. For
both Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games the mixed equilib-
3FIG. 1: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in a complete network with the replicator rule as update rule,
starting with different initial densities of cooperators x0, of values 1/3 (a), 1/5 (b) and 2/3 (c). Each unit square corresponds
to a game: Harmony upper-left, Prisoner’s Dilemma lower-right, Stag Hunt lower-left, Snowdrift upper-right. The outcome is
the same as that of the standard replicator dynamics on a well-mixed population (see text). Notice that Stag Hunt games are
the only ones whose outcome depends on the initial condition, because of their bistable character. The values of the global
measure of cooperation, obtained as the mean value over each game region, are shown next to each game square (above in the
case of Harmony and Snowdrift games, and below for Stag Hunt games and Prisoner’s Dilemmas).
rium xe has a value
xe =
S
S + T − 1 . (3)
Notice that this mixed equilibrium is unstable in Stag
Hunt games whereas it is (globally) stable in Snowdrift
games. It is important to note also that the outcomes
of the four games presented encompass all the possible
equilibrium structures of any symmetric 2× 2 game [50,
51].
The standard equivalent version of this evolutionary
model, for finite populations and discrete time, is built
by placing the population on a complete network and
by making use of the following rule for the update of
strategies, known as the replicator rule or proportional
imitation rule [52, 53]. Let i = 1 . . . N label the individ-
uals in the population. Let si be the strategy of player
i, pii her payoff and Ni her neighborhood, with ki neigh-
bors. With the replicator rule one neighbor j ∈ Ni is
chosen at random. The probability of player i adopting
the strategy of player j at time t is given by
ptij ≡ P{stj → st+1i } =
{
(pitj − piti)/Φ , pitj > piti ,
0 , pitj ≤ piti , (4)
with Φ = max(ki, kj)[max(1, T ) − min(0, S)] to ensure
that ptij ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for this setting
played on a complete network, for different initial condi-
tions. As expected, the results are in complete agreement
with the evolutionary outcome predicted by Eq. (2) for
an infinite well-mixed population. This outcome consti-
tutes the reference against which the effect on cooper-
ation of a given population structure will be assessed.
Additionally, we introduce a quantitative measure CG for
the overall asymptotic cooperation in game G, given by
the average of x∗ over the corresponding region in the
ST -plane. This global index of cooperation has a range
CG ∈ [0, 1] and appears on the graphs by the unit square
of each game.
Besides the replicator update rule, we have considered
other imitative rules that have received attention in pre-
vious research [7]: the multiple replicator, Moran, uncon-
ditional imitation and Fermi rules.
The multiple replicator rule is similar to the replica-
tor rule, with the difference of checking simultaneously
all the neighborhood and thus making a strategy change
more probable. According to this rule, the probability
that player i maintains her strategy is
P{sti → st+1i } =
∏
j∈Ni
(1− ptij), (5)
with ptij given by Eq. (4). In case the strategy update
takes place, the neighbor j whose strategy is adopted by
player i is selected with probability proportional to ptij .
With the Moran rule, inspired on the Moran dynamics
[54], a player chooses the strategy of one of her neighbors,
4or herself’s, with a probability proportional to the payoffs
P{stj → st+1i } =
pitj −Ψ∑
k∈N∗
i
(pitk −Ψ)
, (6)
with N∗i = Ni ∪ {i}. Because payoffs may be nega-
tive in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, the
constant Ψ = maxj∈N∗
i
(kj) min(0, S) is subtracted from
them. Note that with this rule a player can adopt, with
low probability, the strategy of a neighbor that has done
worse than herself.
Another frequently used rule is the unconditional imi-
tation rule, which makes each player choose the strategy
of the neighbor with the largest payoff, provided this pay-
off is greater than the player’s. This is a deterministic
rule, in contrast to all the others considered in this paper,
which are stochastic.
Finally, an update rule that allows to investigate the
influence of the intensity of selection is the Fermi rule
[15, 55], based on the Fermi distribution function. With
this rule, a neighbor j of player i is selected at random
(as with the replicator rule) and the probability of player
i acquiring the strategy of player j is given by
P{stj → st+1i } =
1
1 + exp
(−β (pitj − piti)) . (7)
The parameter β controls the intensity of selection, and
can be understood as the inverse of temperature or noise.
Thus, low β represents high temperature or noise and,
correspondingly, weak selection pressure. Again, strate-
gies performing worse can be chosen with this update
rule.
Having introduced the evolutionary rules we will con-
sider, it is important to recall our choice for the pay-
off matrix (1), and discuss its generality. The replica-
tor rule and the unconditional imitation rule, in degree-
homogeneous networks like the ones considered in this
work, are both invariant under translation and (positive)
scaling of the payoff matrix, so for these rules (1) is the
most general choice. Among the other rules, the dynam-
ics is also preserved for the multiple replicator rule, but
it changes upon translation for the Moran rule, or scaling
for the Fermi rule. The corresponding changes in these
last two cases amount to a modification of the intensity
of selection, which we also consider in this work. There-
fore we believe that Eq. (1) is general enough for our
purposes.
From the viewpoint of statistical physics, these evolu-
tionary models are non-equilibrium systems that do not
have a Hamiltonian and whose dynamics is determined
by local rules. Some studies have shown, for some partic-
ular cases, that they belong to the Directed Percolation
universality class [15, 56].
FIG. 2: Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in a square
lattice with degree k = 8, when the game is the Prisoner’s
Dilemma defined by Eq. (8) ( = 0), as studied by Nowak
and May [6] (update rule: unconditional imitation). Note
that the outcome with replicator dynamics on a well mixed
population is x∗ = 0 for all the displayed range of the tempta-
tion parameter T . Notice also the singularity at T = 1.4, with
surrounding points located at T = 1.3999 and T = 1.4001 (see
Fig. 7 and related discussion in Sec. IV). Lines are a guide to
the eye.
III. OPEN QUESTIONS IN PREVIOUS
RESEARCH
First of all, we want to make clear that what follows
does not intend to be an exhaustive account of previous
results in the literature. We refer the interested reader
to [7] for such a detailed review. Our aim in this section
is to present what are, from our point of view, impor-
tant results in the field, focusing only on those that deal
with the simplest cases of games on networks, namely
symmetric 2× 2 games on homogeneous fixed networks.
These results form the basis upon which one can address
more sophisticated settings, such as those dealing with
complex networks [57, 58], co-evolution of strategies and
networks [59, 60] or meta-evolution of the update rules
[61], to name just a few of the options that are being pur-
sued by current research. While reviewing the available
literature we found difficulties in drawing general conclu-
sions, as the differences between the models, regarding
the game, the network or the update rule employed, pre-
vented a meaningful comparison of results. Moreover,
some pending issues and contradictions arose when we
tried to integrate the main conclusions of published work,
motivating in the end the present study.
We begin with the pioneering paper published by
Nowak and May in 1992 [6], which showed the significant
fostering of cooperation that the spatial distribution of
a population is able to produce in Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This has become the prototypical example of the promo-
tion of cooperation favored by the structure of a popu-
lation, also known as network reciprocity [5]. They con-
5sidered the following Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C
D
(
1 0
T 
)
,
(8)
with 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and  <∼ 0. Note that this one-
dimensional parametrization corresponds in the ST -
plane to a region near the boundary with Snowdrift
games. Figure 2 shows the great enhancement of co-
operation reported by [6]. The authors explained this
influence in terms of the formation of clusters of coop-
erators, which give cooperators enough payoff to survive
even when surrounded by (some) defectors.
A year later, Huberman and Glance [36] questioned
the generality of the results reported by Nowak and May
[6], in terms of the synchronicity of the update of strate-
gies, which is a very relevant issue in biological contexts.
Nowak and May used synchronous update, which means
that every player is updated at the same time, so the
population evolves in successive generations. Huberman
and Glance, on the contrary, employed asynchronous up-
date (also called random sequential update), in which in-
dividuals are updated independently one by one, so the
neighborhood of each player remains the same while her
strategy is updated. They showed that, for a particu-
lar game among those studied in [6] —i.e. for a particu-
lar value of T in Eq. (8)—, the asymptotic cooperation
obtained with synchronous update disappeared. Nowak
and May, together with Bonhoeffer, published in 1994 a
reply [10] to this criticism, defending the generality and
robustness of the beneficial effect of spatial structure on
a variety of scenarios. Subsequent works have reinforced
this later viewpoint, restricting the effect reported by [36]
to particular instances of Prisoner’s Dilemma [11] or to
the short memory of players [32]. Other works, however,
in the different context of snowdrift games [27, 28] have
found that the influence on cooperation can be positive
or negative, in the asynchronous case compared with the
synchronous one. Then, an important open question is:
To which extent the synchronicity (or the lack of it) has
an influence, in general, on evolutionary games?
In 1996 Killingback and Doebeli published a paper [25]
that studied a spatial model similar to that of [6], but
they considered Hawk-Dove games (equivalent to Snow-
drift games) instead of Prisoner’s Dilemmas. They re-
ported a lowering of the proportion of Hawks in the pop-
ulation, which in terms of the evolution of cooperation
means a promotion of the cooperative strategy. Later,
Hauert and Doebeli published another result [9] report-
ing an inhibition of cooperation precisely on Snowdrift
games in a spatial model. They studied the following
parametrization of Snowdrift games
C D
C
D
(
1 2− T
T 0
)
,
(9)
again with 1 ≤ T ≤ 2. The unexpected result obtained
by the authors is displayed in Fig. 3. Only for low T
FIG. 3: Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in a square
lattice with degree k = 8, when the game is the Snowdrift
defined by Eq. (9), as studied by Hauert and Doebeli [9] (up-
date rule: replicator rule). Lines are a guide to the eye. The
result for a well mixed population is displayed as reference as
a dashed line.
there is some improvement in cooperation, whereas for
medium and high T cooperation is inhibited. This is a
surprising result, considering [25] and because the basic
game, Snowdrift, is in principle more favorable to coop-
eration. Its only stable equilibrium is a mixed strategy
population with some density of cooperators (3), whereas
the unique equilibrium in Prisoner’s Dilemma is full de-
fection (see Fig. 1). The authors explained their result in
terms of the inhibition of cluster formation and growth,
at the microscopic level, caused by the payoff structure
of Snowdrift games. We find this explanation controver-
sial, because the results of Nowak and May were obtained
precisely near the boundary between Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Snowdrift, so this argument implied a discontinuous
transition in the microscopic dynamics at this boundary.
Nevertheless, it is very easy to check that there is not a
discontinuity neither in the payoff matrix nor in the equi-
librium structure of the games at this boundary. Hence,
where does this transition in the microscopic dynamics
come from?
Another result concerning Snowdrift games was pub-
lished in 2005 by Sysi-Aho and co-workers [26]. They
studied the same one-dimensional parametrization of
Snowdrift games (9), but used myopic best response
[30, 62] as the rule for the update of strategies. They
reported a modification in the cooperator density at equi-
librium, with an increase for some subrange of the param-
eter T and a decrease for the other, as Fig. 4 shows. It is
very remarkable that the effect on cooperation (promo-
tion or inhibition) is in this case opposite to the result of
Hauert and Doebeli [9] (Fig. 3).
Following those works on Snowdrift or Hawk-Dove
games on spatial lattices, Tomassini and co-workers
[28] performed an exhaustive study with an equivalent
parametrization of Hawk-Dove games, considering sev-
eral update rules and also other topologies as random
and small-world networks. They concluded that the in-
6FIG. 4: Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in a square
lattice with degree k = 8, when the game is the Snowdrift
defined by Eq. (9), as studied by Sysi-Aho and co-workers [26]
(update rule: best response). Lines are a guide to the eye.
The result for a well mixed population is displayed as reference
as a dashed line. Note how the promotion or inhibition of
cooperation does not follow the same variation as a function of
T that in the case studied by Hauert and Doebeli [9] (Fig. 3).
fluence of spatial structure on cooperation with this kind
of games can be positive or negative, and that it depends
on the update rule, on the value of the parameter T and,
to a lesser extent, on the synchronicity or asynchronic-
ity of the updating. An important question is pending
here therefore: Is this sensitivity to the update rule an
exclusive feature of Snowdrift games or, on the contrary,
should it be expected to occur with other games, such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Another open question in the existing literature is the
importance of the transitivity of links or clustering [63]
in the influence of spatial structure on the evolution of
cooperation. In an influential paper published by Cohen
and co-workers [18], the authors proved that the posi-
tive effects on cooperation of some regular lattices were
in fact attainable with random networks of the same de-
gree. They concluded that, for the model networks they
were studying, the relevant topological feature was not
the spatial arrangement of links, and their subsequent
correlations or clustering, but the context preservation
of players during the iterated game, already present in
a random network. Later, Ifti and co-workers [22] per-
formed a more exhaustive study in the space of network
models, considering different topologies and several de-
grees, reaching the opposite conclusion that “the clus-
tering is the factor that facilitates and maintains high
average investment values” (i.e. cooperation). The sub-
sequent work of Tomassini and co-workers [28] somehow
confirmed this point, as they showed, in the different con-
text of Hawk-Dove games, the key role of the network
clustering in the positive or negative influence on coop-
eration.
Finally, all these previous studies have considered the
influence of spatial networks in the case of strong selec-
tion pressure, which means that the fitness of individu-
als is totally determined by the payoffs that result from
the game. In general this may not be the case, and so
to relax this restriction the fitness can be expressed as
f = 1−w+wpi [64]. The parameter w represents the in-
tensity of selection and can vary between w = 1 (strong
selection limit) and w >∼ 0 (weak selection limit). The
weak selection limit has the nice property of been usually
tractable in an analytic manner, and thus it has become
a key aspect of the field, with a great deal of related work
being done in the last few years. For instance, Ohtsuki
and Nowak have studied evolutionary games on homoge-
neous random networks using this approach [65], finding
an interesting relation with replicator dynamics on well
mixed populations. Using our normalization of the game
(1), their result can be written as the following payoff
matrix (
1 S + ∆
T −∆ 0
)
. (10)
This means that the evolution in a population struc-
tured according to a random homogeneous network, in
the weak selection limit, is the same as that of a well
mixed population with a game defined by this modified
payoff matrix. The effect of the network thus reduces to
the term ∆, which depends on the network degree, the
game and the update rule. With respect to the influ-
ence of cooperation it admits a very straightforward in-
terpretation: If both the original and the modified payoff
matrix correspond to a Harmony or Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, then there is no influence, because the population
ends up equally in full cooperation or full defection; oth-
erwise, cooperation is enhanced if ∆ > 0, and inhibited
if ∆ < 0. The actual values of ∆, for the update rules
they studied, namely Pairwise Comparison (PC), Imita-
tion (IM) and Death-Birth (DB) (see [65] for full details),
are
∆PC =
S − (T − 1)
k − 2 (11)
∆IM =
k + S − (T − 1)
(k + 1)(k − 2) (12)
∆DB =
k + 3[S − (T − 1)]
(k + 3)(k − 2) , (13)
k being the degree of the network. (Note that these re-
sults correspond to the weak selection limit.)
Considering the influence on Prisoner’s Dilemma, first
note that S < 0 and T > 1 in all games of this kind, so
the term S − (T − 1) is always negative. It is easy to
see that the most favorable rule for cooperation is then
Imitation, but even in this case the network has no ef-
fect on the outcome (the game remains in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma square) if S < −1/(k−1) and T > 1+1/(k−1).
For network degrees as the examples above (e.g. k = 8
yields 1/(k − 1) ≈ 0.143) this means that the evolution-
ary outcome of most games in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
square remains unaffected, i.e. most games end up in
full defection anyway. With the Death-Birth rule the
7region with no influence is even bigger (S < −1/(k + 1)
and T > 1 + 1/(k + 1)) and with Pairwise Compari-
son there is no effect on the outcome of any Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Therefore, several questions arise here: Is this
reduced effect on cooperation caused by the weak se-
lection pressure, by the homogeneous random topology
(which lacks spatial structure) or by the combination of
the two? What is the outcome in regular lattices with
weak selection?
We thus see that there are indeed some important open
questions regarding the synchronicity of the updating,
the choice of the update rule, the clustering of the net-
work and the intensity of selection. Previous research has
proved that these issues play a role in the effect of spatial
structure on the evolution of cooperation, for particular
parametrizations of Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Snowdrift
games. However, different conclusions were obtained de-
pending on the game, and as a consequence a compre-
hensive picture of these issues on the wider space of 2×2
games, including other games as for example coordina-
tion or Stag Hunt games, is not available. To provide it,
we designed a unified framework of simulation and per-
formed an exhaustive and systematic simulation study,
covering all the possible configurations of games, net-
works and update rules introduced above. The results
that we have obtained and, more importantly, the gen-
eral conclusions that they have allowed us to reach are
presented in the remaining of the paper.
IV. A UNIFIED STUDY OF EVOLUTIONARY
GAMES ON SPATIAL NETWORKS
To assess the effect of spatial structure we have stud-
ied the evolution of the four classes of 2 × 2 games pre-
sented in Sec. II on populations distributed over regular
lattices of degrees k = 4, 6, and 8, along with different
rules for the update of strategies. Additionally, to dis-
cern what can be attributed to the spatial distribution
of links and what to the mere limitation in the number
of neighbors, we have compared in every case with the
results on homogeneous random networks of the same de-
gree. To ensure a correct comparison of results we have
employed as much as possible the same parameters in all
the simulations (see the Appendix for full details).
Figure 5 displays the comparison of results between
homogeneous random networks and regular lattices, for
the particular case of the replicator update rule. A close
examination of the different panels, together with the
reference outcome of Fig. 1(b), yields the following con-
clusions. In the first place, the influence of homogeneous
networks in combination with the replicator rule is very
weak in Harmony and Prisoner’s Dilemma games, as the
mean indexes of cooperation that appear by each square
show. The effect is thus concentrated on Stag Hunt and
Snowdrift games, and it consists, in all cases, on a pro-
motion of cooperation in Stag Hunt and an inhibition in
Snowdrift. Considering the dependence on network de-
gree, the influence of homogeneous random networks di-
minishes for larger degrees, as can be seen in the graphs
A-C of Fig. 5, from left to right. This variation with de-
gree is, however, very different in the case of regular lat-
tices. Whereas for k = 4 the outcome is similar for both
kinds of networks –albeit slightly stronger in the lattices–
, the influence of the network increases significantly for
lattices of larger degrees. These are precisely the condi-
tions where the influence of spatial structure shows up,
as a large promotion of cooperation in Stag Hunt and
a comparatively smaller inhibition in Snowdrift. We will
justify in the next section that the key topological feature
underlying this effect of spatial structure is the presence
of clustering in the network, understood as link transitiv-
ity or, equivalently, triangles in the graph [63]. For our
purposes the clustering coefficient C of a network is de-
fined as the probability that any two neighbors of a given
node are neighbors themselves. Thus, regular lattices of
degree k = 4 have C = 0, whereas those of degrees k =
6 and 8 have, respectively, values of C = 2/5 = 0.4 and
C = 3/7 ≈ 0.43.
Changing the rule for the update of strategies to the
multiple replicator rule only causes small quantitative
changes in the results. The other stochastic rule, i.e.
the Moran rule, has a larger impact, as it clearly reduces
the influence of the network, but it maintains to some
extent the positive effect on Stag Hunt of spatial lattices,
as can be seen in Fig. 6.
The rule, however, that has the greatest impact on the
evolutionary outcome is unconditional imitation. Fig-
ure 7 presents the results for this rule. In the first place,
homogeneous random networks clearly have an influence
on the evolutionary outcome with this rule, for all the
degrees considered. They clearly promote cooperation in
Stag Hunt, and even some influence is noticeable on Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Second, it is very remarkable the sim-
ilarity in results between random networks and regular
lattices for degree k = 4, with the transition lines located
at the same positions (see [21] for a detailed study of these
transition lines on the regular lattice). And finally, large
differences appear again when the spatial lattices have
clustering, i.e. for degrees k = 6 and 8. In these cases
spatial structure not only induces almost full coopera-
tion in Stag Hunt games, but also enforces cooperation
notably in Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma games, to
the greatest extent we have obtained for any setting in
the systematic study we present in this paper.
It is also interesting to note, in the case of uncondi-
tional imitation compared to the other update rules, the
non-monotonous variation of results across the ST -space.
With this rule the evolutionary outcome is determined by
the dominance or coexistence of certain privileged con-
figurations of cooperators and/or defectors (see Sec. V
and also [21]). This dominance or coexistence depends
in turn on the balance of payoffs along the correspond-
ing interfaces between configurations. The balance, i.e.
which configuration obtains more payoff than some other,
switches when crossing some boundary on the ST -space,
8FIG. 5: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in homogeneous random networks (upper row, A to C) compared
to regular lattices (lower row, D to F), with degrees k = 4 (A, D), 6 (B, E) and 8 (C, F). The update rule is the replicator rule
and the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. The values of the global index of cooperation in the upper row display the
weak effect of homogeneous random networks (compare with Fig. 1(b)), which is opposite in Stag Hunt (lower-left square) and
Snowdrift games (upper-right square). Comparing both rows, the differences are specially significant in Stag Hunt for k = 6
and 8, revealing the strong promotion of cooperation caused by regular lattices with large clustering (see text). The influence
on Harmony and Prisoner’s Dilemma games is negligible in all cases.
giving rise to a non-monotonous response as the lead-
ing configurations change when varying the parameters
S and T (see Figs. 2 and 7).
From the viewpoint of the open questions posed in
Sec. III, these results prove that the effect of spatial struc-
ture, in the context of 2 × 2 games, is highly dependent
on the update rule. This dependence explains the appar-
ent contradiction between the promotion of cooperation
reported by Nowak and May for Prisoner’s Dilemmas [6]
and by Killingback and Doebeli for Snowdrift games [25]
vs. the inhibition on the same Snowdrift games reported
by Hauert and Doebeli [9]. In the first two works the
update rule was unconditional imitation, whereas in the
third the authors used the replicator rule. Note that this
explanation is in agreement with the discussion in [28],
which deals exclusively with Snowdrift games. Compar-
ing the Figs. 5 F and 7 F, it is clear that the influence on
games around the boundary between Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Snowdrift is similar and without discontinuities if the
update rule is the same.
In what concerns the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the above re-
sults also prove that the promotion of cooperation in this
game is not robust against changes in the update rule,
because the beneficial effect of spatial lattices practically
disappears for rules different from unconditional imita-
tion, when seen in the wider scope of the ST -plane. No-
tice that this conclusion supersedes previously published
work, as for example [35], where it was claimed that often
spatial extension was indeed capable of promoting coop-
erative behavior, in particular for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
for a small but important parameter range. Further, [35]
stated that the conclusions were robust and appeared
to be almost independent of the update rule of the lat-
tice. As we have explained in the introduction, there
were problems with the simulations in [35].
On the contrary, coordination or Stag Hunt games are
the games where the positive effect on cooperation of
spatial structure is robust against changes in the update
9FIG. 6: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in homogeneous random networks (A to C) compared to regular
lattices (D to F), with degrees k = 4 (A, D), 6 (B, E) and 8 (C, F). The update rule is the Moran rule and the initial density
of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. With this update rule the effect is very small, in comparison with the other stochastic rules (see
Fig. 5). In any case, the most relevant effect, albeit much weaker than in the other cases, is again a promotion of cooperation
in Stag Hunt games with regular lattices (D to F).
rule, in particular the introduction of stochasticity. This
property, together with the fact that this kind of games
can be an attractor on evolutionary dynamics of the game
payoffs themselves [34], may be of a special relevance in
the problem of the evolution of cooperation.
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from
the results presented so far is the relevance of the clus-
tering coefficient to the effect of spatial structure: only
when the clustering coefficient is high, the spatial distri-
bution of the population makes a difference in compar-
ison to a random arrangement of links that just limits
the number of interactions of players and preserves their
context. This difference holds in the ST -plane, i.e. for
whichever game among those considered, and is robust
against changes in the update rule. This point explains
the difference between the conclusions of Cohen et al.
[18] and those of Ifti et al. [22] and Tomassini et al. [28].
In [18], rectangular lattices of degree k = 4 were consid-
ered, which have strictly zero clustering because there are
not closed triangles in the network, hence finding no dif-
ferences in outcome between the spatial and the random
topology. In the latter case, on the contrary, both stud-
ies employed rectangular lattices of degree k = 8, which
do have clustering, and thus they identified it as a key
feature of the network, for the particular parametriza-
tions of the games they were studying, namely Prisoner’s
Dilemma [22] and Snowdrift [28].
To check the robustness of these conclusions, and also
for the intrinsic interest of complex topologies, we have
included small-world networks [63, 66] in our system-
atic simulations. Our procedure to build the network
is based on the Watts-Strogatz algorithm [67]. We start
from a regular lattice and perform, with low probabil-
ity, a random reshuffling of links preserving the degree of
the nodes, with the aim of lowering the mean distance
between nodes while maintaining the high clustering co-
efficient and the homogeneity in degree. In our case,
we have started from the two-dimensional lattices pre-
sented above, so we can consider the resulting network
as a slightly disordered lattice, which maintains, however,
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in homogeneous random networks (upper row, A to C) compared
to regular lattices (lower row, D to F), with degrees k = 4 (A, D), 6 (B, E) and 8 (C, F). The update rule is unconditional
imitation and the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. Cooperation is fostered in Stag Hunt games in all cases. As
in Fig. 5, the differences between homogeneous random networks and regular lattices of the same degree are significant only
when the regular lattices have large clustering (k = 6 and 8). Note the non-monotonicity of the results, compared with the
other update rules (see text). With this update rule the promotion of cooperation clearly extends to Snowdrift and Prisoner’s
Dilemma games.
the local property of large clustering. Figure 8 shows a
comparison between the results obtained with the small-
world topology and the corresponding initial regular lat-
tice, for all four update rules. The evolutionary outcomes
are almost identical, and the tiny quantitative differences
can only be noticed by means of the mean cooperation
index associated with each game. Consequently, a small
number of defects in the spatial structure of a lattice does
not alter its effect on the evolutionary outcome, even if
they lead to a drastic decrease of the diameter of the net-
work. Very similar results are obtained for other values
of the probability of reshuffling, as long as the network
clustering is preserved.
Considering these results from another point of view,
we can state that the influence on cooperation of the
small-world topology, in what concerns the evolutionary
outcome and at least for the kinds of games and update
rules considered in this work, is determined by its feature
of high clustering, which in the Watts-Strogatz model
comes from the regular lattice employed to generate the
network. This conclusion is in agreement with existent
theoretical work on Prisoner’s Dilemma [17, 37, 38] and
its extensions [68, 69], on Snowdrift games [28], and also
with experimental studies on coordination games [70].
The reader should note that some of these works have re-
ported a greater efficiency of small-world networks com-
pared to regular lattices, concerning the time of conver-
gence to the stationary state, a property that we have
also verified in the broader scope of games of our study.
It is reasonable to conjecture that this improvement in
efficiency is caused by the other typical small-world fea-
ture, the low mean distance, as it is discussed in Sec. V,
which deals with the model dynamics.
All the results presented so far have been obtained with
a synchronous update of strategies. Recalling the impact
of using asynchronous update reported by Huberman and
Glance [36], we have studied all the previous models in
its asynchronous version. We have found that the influ-
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in regular lattices (left column) compared to small-world networks
(right column), all with degree k = 8. The update rules are: replicator rule (first row), multiple replicator rule (second row),
Moran rule (third row) and unconditional imitation (fourth row). The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. Notice that
the panels A, E and G are the same as, respectively, the panels 5 F, 6 F and 7 F, repeated here to facilitate the comparison.
The evolutionary outcomes are practically identical for all the update rules, showing that the effect of small-world networks on
the asymptotic state is due to the high clustering, also present in the regular lattices used to generate them. The probability
of reshuffling used to generate the small-world networks was p = 0.01 (see text).
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FIG. 9: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in regular lattices of degree k = 8, with synchronous update (left
column) compared to asynchronous (right column). The update rules are: replicator rule (first row), multiple replicator rule
(second row), Moran rule (third row) and unconditional imitation (fourth row). The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5.
As in Fig. 8, the panels A, E and G are the same as, respectively, the panels 5 F, 6 F and 7 F. With the replicator and
multiple replicator rules the evolutionary outcome is very similar, whereas some differences appear in the case of the Moran
rule. With unconditional imitation the results are also quite similar, but there are differences for some points, specially those
in the Snowdrift square with S <∼ 0.3 and T > 5/3 ≈ 1.67. The particular game studied by [36], which reported an inhibition
of cooperation due to the asynchronous update, belongs to this region.
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Time evolution of the density of cooperators x in regular lattices of degree k = 8, for typical realizations
of Stag Hunt (left column) and Snowdrift games (right column). The update rules are the replicator rule (upper row) and
unconditional imitation (lower row). The realizations with synchronous update are represented by continuous lines and filled
symbols, whereas the asynchronous ones appear with dashed lines and empty symbols. Colors and symbols are as indicated in
the legends. The Stag Hunt games for the replicator rule (A) are: a, S = −0.4, T = 0.4; b, S = −0.5, T = 0.5; c, S = −0.6,
T = 0.6; d, S = −0.7, T = 0.7; e, S = −0.8, T = 0.8. For unconditional imitation the Stag Hunt games (C) are: a, S = −0.6,
T = 0.6; b, S = −0.7, T = 0.7; c, S = −0.8, T = 0.8; d, S = −0.9, T = 0.9; e, S = −1.0, T = 1.0. The Snowdrift games are,
for both update rules (B, D): a, S = 0.9, T = 1.1; b, S = 0.7, T = 1.3; c, S = 0.5, T = 1.5; d, S = 0.3, T = 1.7; e, S = 0.1,
T = 1.9. The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5 in all cases. The time scale of the asynchronous realizations has been
re-scaled by the size of the population N = 104, so that for both kinds of update a time step represents the same number of
update events in the population. Figures A and B show that, in the case of the stochastic rule, not only the outcome but also
the time evolution is independent of the kind of update. With unconditional imitation the results are also very similar for Stag
Hunt (C), but not so much in Snowdrift (D), displaying the influence of the type of updating in this case. Notice also that
unconditional imitation causes a much faster evolution than the replicator rule.
ence of asynchronicity is the exception rather than the
rule, and that this influence is very dependent on the
update rule used. As Fig. 9 shows, with the replicator
and multiple replicator rules the evolutionary outcome is
very similar, whereas for the Moran rule and uncondi-
tional imitation some differences appear. With this last
rule, which was the one used in [36], the only important
variation takes place in a particular subset of Snowdrift
games. Therefore, the discrepancy reported by [36] is re-
stricted to a small subset of 2 × 2 games and the use of
unconditional imitation as update rule. This conclusion
is in agreement with previous work which has studied this
issue in more limited settings, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
[10, 11, 32] or the Snowdrift game [27, 28]. We can add
that, if the time is re-scaled so that a time step repre-
sents the same number of update events in the popula-
tion, then the time evolution is also very similar, specially
for stochastic update rules, as Fig. 10 reveals.
Finally, we have investigated the influence of the inten-
sity of selection on the evolutionary outcome of games in
spatial lattices, by means of the Fermi rule. Figure 11
displays an example of the results for different intensities
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in regular lattices of degree k = 8, for the Fermi update rule with
β equal to 10 (A), 1 (B) and 0.1 (C). The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. For high β the result is quite similar to that
obtained with the replicator rule (Fig. 5 F). As β decreases, or equivalently for weaker intensities of selection, the influence
becomes smaller and more symmetrical between Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games.
of selection, showing that weak selection has two impor-
tant effects, in comparison with strong selection. First,
it reduces the influence of the network on the evolution-
ary outcome, and second, it symmetrises its effects on
Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games. These two effects are
consistent with the analytical calculations for the weak
selection limit and homogeneous random networks [65]
discussed in the previous section. Our results provide
thus evidence of the following two key aspects of weak
selection, compared to strong selection, which to the best
of our knowledge have not been reported in the literature.
On one hand, the magnitude of the effect of spatial struc-
ture is clearly smaller, with evolutionary outcomes much
more similar to those of an unstructured population. On
the other hand, the nature of the effect is also different,
as weak selection has the same influence on cooperation
(promotion or inhibition) in Stag Hunt and Snowdrift
games, namely on those games symmetric with respect
to the line S + T = 1 in the ST -plane.
V. DISCUSSION
In the previous section we have given our answer, by
means of a systematic and exhaustive simulation pro-
gram, to the open questions that we presented in Sec. III.
We have highlighted the importance of the update rule
and the singularity of unconditional imitation, which is
the only rule among those studied here that yields a
significant promotion of cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We have provided compelling evidence that,
in general, the game in which the positive effect of spatial
structure on cooperation is robust against changes in the
update rule is the Stag Hunt, a coordination game. With
stochastic rules, such as the replicator rule, this promo-
tion of cooperation in Stag Hunt games is accompanied
by an asymmetric influence, i.e. an inhibition of coopera-
tion, in Snowdrift games. In addition, we have found that
the strength of the effect of spatial structure is directly
linked to the presence of clustering in the network. And
finally, we have seen how weak selection attenuates the
influence of spatial structure and symmetrizes the effects
on Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games.
In the present Section we want to consider the causes
of such features, looking for explanations rooted on the
basic mechanisms that take place during the evolution of
the population. To this aim, let us consider a population
with no structure, i.e. connected by a complete network.
A cooperator and a defector obtain the following payoffs
pic = (nc − 1) + ndS ≈ N (x+ (1− x)S) , (14)
pid = ncT = NxT, (15)
N being the population size, nc and nd the total number
of cooperators and defectors, and x the global fraction of
cooperators.
With a structured population, however, each individ-
ual only plays with her neighbors. Then, the payoffs are
pic = nˆc + nˆdS = k (xˆ+ (1− xˆ)S) , (16)
pid = nˆcT = kxˆT, (17)
nˆc and nˆd being the number of cooperators and defectors
that the player is connected to, and xˆ the local fraction
of cooperators in the player’s neighborhood. Note that x
is a global variable, whereas xˆ is defined for every player.
As a result, the effect of population structure can be un-
derstood as the replacement of the global density x by
the player-dependent local densities xˆ.
15
Let us now assume that the effect of spatial structure
is to increase the local densities xˆ with respect to the
global density x. Considering Stag Hunt games in the
first place, for a given initial condition x0 there must be
a subregion of the Stag Hunt square in which xe verifies
x0 < xe < xˆ
0. For these games a complete network would
produce an outcome of x∗ = 0, whereas the structured
population would yield x∗ = 1, with the subsequent pro-
motion of cooperation. On the other hand, for Snowdrift
games, the equilibrium will be reached when xˆ∗ = xe.
Since x∗ < xˆ∗ this causes a global inhibition of coopera-
tion.
This mechanism would explain the opposite effects on
Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games, and the absence of ef-
fects when the game has only one equilibrium, which is
the case with Harmony and Prisoner’s Dilemma games.
In fact, the increase in the local densities is enforced
by the correlations that arise as a result of the spatial
structure, i.e. because several neighbors observe simul-
taneously the same high or low xˆ, as we will see below.
For homogeneous random networks and lattices with low
clustering, correlations are weak, and hence their influ-
ence on cooperation is hardly noticeable. Lattices with
large clustering, however, allow strong correlations to de-
velop, raising the local densities to such an extent that
they have an important influence on the evolutionary out-
come. Considering the time evolution in the case of Stag
Hunt games, the local densities fluctuate over the popu-
lation in the initial random condition, with cooperators
more or less connected to other cooperators. Those with
small xˆ eventually disappear, while those with large xˆ
convert, with high probability, their defective neighbors
to cooperators. This is the point when the large clus-
tering plays its crucial role: newly converted coopera-
tors will be connected not only to the cooperator whose
strategy they have just adopted, but also to some of her
neighbors (because of the network clustering), which are,
with high probability, cooperators as well (because of the
high xˆ of the initial cooperator). Hence the new coop-
erator will also have a large local density of cooperators.
Then, this process continues until the population reaches
full cooperation.
In other words, for Stag Hunt games the large cluster-
ing of the network allows the high values of local densities
caused by random fluctuations in the initial condition to
propagate all over the population. This is the reason why,
in the range of parameters where the population struc-
ture is critical for the prevailing of cooperation, meso-
scopic structures develop in the form of compact clusters
of cooperators, as was observed by Nowak and May [6].
It is at the interfaces of these clusters that the explained
mechanism takes place. See Fig. 12 for some snapshots
of a typical example of this phenomenon. It is clear that
for these interfaces to propagate all over the population,
the nodes that provide the clustering to the network, i.e.
those that have a number of neighbors that are neighbors
themselves, must be connected throughout the full net-
work structure, as it is the case with the spatial networks
studied here. Interestingly, this observation is in agree-
ment with the importance of the “percolation of overlap-
ping triangles” reported in the context of other network
models [71]. Considering small-world networks, clusters
of cooperators are able to grow like in regular lattices,
because of the network clustering. But in this case, the
existence of “shortcuts” in the network, due to the low
mean distance between nodes, facilitates the spreading
of clusters, thus reducing the time needed for the popu-
lation to reach full cooperation.
In the case of Snowdrift games, cooperators tend to
aggregate as well, but this immediately raises the payoff
of the surrounding defectors more than that of the co-
operators, which makes them switch to defection, thus
disintegrating the embryonic cluster. The overall effect
is a decrease in the global cooperator density. Besides, as
the nucleation effect does not develop beyond its initial
stages, the inhibition of cooperation in Snowdrift games
is not as strong as the promotion in Stag Hunt games.
Nevertheless, unconditional imitation does promote
cooperation in Snowdrift and even in Prisoner’s
Dilemma, on lattices with large clustering. Obviously,
the effect of the network topology is basically the same
as with the stochastic update rules. This sharp differ-
ence in results lies in the lack of stochasticity of uncon-
ditional imitation, which makes the cluster interfaces ad-
vance uniformly, as Fig. 13 illustrates. As a consequence,
the dynamics of flat interfaces takes on a special relevance
in this case, determining the evolutionary outcome. For
example, computing the payoff balance between cooper-
ators and defectors arranged on both sides on a flat in-
terface yields the most important transition line between
full cooperation and full defection in the ST -plane (see
Figs. 7 E-F): T − S = 2 for k = 6, and T − S = 5/3 for
k = 8, as was reported in [6] (see also [21]).
An interesting “rule of thumb” to estimate the fate
of cooperation on a spatially structured population was
proposed by Hauert [35, 72]: cooperation emergence is di-
rectly related to the stability and growth of 3×3 clusters
(see also [16] for a discussion on this point). We confirm
this rule for unconditional imitation and k = 8, because
in that case the growing conditions of a 3× 3 cluster are
exactly the same as the advance conditions of a flat in-
terface mentioned above. Interestingly, this rule implies
an independence of the evolutionary outcome from the
initial density of cooperators x0. As long as there were,
in the initial population, a small cluster that would grow
(in fact, with k = 8, a 2 × 3 cluster is sufficient), the
population would reach full cooperation. As expected,
Fig. 14 shows that this is the case with unconditional im-
itation (lower row). But with the replicator rule (upper
row) the corresponding transition between full coopera-
tion and full defection does depend on the initial density
of cooperators. This dependence on the initial condi-
tion means that, in the case of stochastic update rules,
there is not one or a small subset of privileged configu-
rations that determine the evolutionary outcome. This
fact suggests that techniques such as pair approximation
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Snapshots of the evolution of a population on a regular lattice of degree k = 8, playing a Stag Hunt
game (S = −0.65 and T = 0.65). Cooperators are displayed in red (light gray) and defectors in blue (dark gray). The update
rule is the replicator rule and the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. The upper left label shows the time step t. During
the initial steps, cooperators with low local density of cooperators xˆ disappear, meanwhile those with high local density grow
into the clusters that eventually take up the full population.
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FIG. 13: (Color online) Snapshots of the evolution of a population on a regular lattice of degree k = 8, playing a Stag Hunt
game (S = −0.65 and T = 0.65). Cooperators and defectors are displayed as in Fig. 12. The update rule is unconditional
imitation and the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 1/3 (this lower value than that of Fig. 12 has been used to make the
evolution longer and thus more easily observable). The upper left label shows the time step t. As with the replicator rule,
during the initial time steps clusters emerge from cooperators with high local density of cooperators xˆ. In this case, however,
the interfaces advance deterministically at each time step, thus producing a much more rapid evolution (compare the time
labels with those of Fig. 12).
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FIG. 14: (Color online) Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in a regular lattice of degree k = 8, for different initial densities
of cooperators x0 = 1/3 (A, D), 1/2 (B, E) and 2/3 (C, F). The update rules are the replicator rule (upper row, A to C)
and unconditional imitation (lower row, D to F). With the replicator rule, the evolutionary outcome in Stag Hunt depends
on the initial condition, as is revealed by the displacement of the transition line between full cooperation and full defection.
However, with unconditional imitation this transition line remains in the same position, thus showing the insensitivity to the
initial condition. In this case, the outcome is determined by the presence of small clusters of cooperators in the starting random
population, which is ensured for a large range of values of the initial densities of cooperators x0.
methods [73] are more appropriate to obtain estimations
in this case. Notice also that, for stochastic rules and
Stag Hunt games, in contrast to the “leveling out” of the
initial density of cooperators reported by [35], we have
found a promotion of cooperation for all the initial con-
ditions studied, as the first row of Fig. 14 displays in
comparison with Fig. 1.
Finally, the comparison of results between strong and
weak selection pressure reveals important qualitative dif-
ferences: with weak selection the effect of spatial struc-
ture is clearly attenuated and the asymmetry between
the influence on Stag Hunt and Snowdrift games becomes
a symmetric effect. We have seen that the effects with
strong selection are rooted in the strong correlations that
appear in the population as clusters form and grow. With
weak selection correlations develop in a completely dif-
ferent manner, hence the change in results. The weak se-
lection limit in the Fermi rule, given by β → 0 in Eq. (7),
yields a probability of copying the strategy of a neigh-
bor very close to 0.5, with a little bias proportional to
the difference of payoffs. As a consequence, the changes
in the local densities that the game causes diffuse over
the population, without directly affecting the fate of the
neighborhood that originated them, and thus giving rise
to much weaker correlations than in the strong selection
case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have addressed some important open
questions about the effect of spatial structure on the evo-
lution of cooperation. We have found an unquestionable
dependence of the evolutionary outcome on the update
rule, which has in turn consequences on the robustness
of the spatial effects and on the influence of the syn-
chronicity of the updating. Coordination or Stag Hunt
games have showed up as the prototypical games for the
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positive effect of spatial structure on the evolution of co-
operation. The importance of network clustering as a
general property has been clarified, along with its role in
the influence of small-world networks. Selection pressure
has also been identified as a key factor in these mod-
els, with a clear qualitative and quantitative influence,
related to the symmetry of effects on coordination and
anti-coordination games.
Methodologically, our work makes it clear the inter-
est of studying the two-dimensional ST -space of 2 × 2
games, beyond a particular case or a one-dimensional
parametrization of a game. Recent work on different top-
ics has also shown so, as for example that of Santos and
co-workers on the issue of network heterogeneity and the
scale-free property [57, 74].
To conclude, we must recognize the strong dependence
on details of evolutionary games on spatial networks. As
a consequence, it does not seem plausible to expect gen-
eral laws that could be applied in a wide range of practical
settings. On the contrary, a close modeling including the
kind of game, the evolutionary dynamics and the popu-
lation structure of the concrete problem seems manda-
tory to reach sound and compelling conclusions. With
no doubt this is an enormous challenge, but we believe
that this is one of the most promising paths that the
community working in the field can explore.
APPENDIX: METHODS INFORMATION
All the simulations were performed for a population
size of N = 104. The initial density of cooperators was
x0 = 0.5 and the update of strategies was done syn-
chronously, unless otherwise stated.
With synchronous update, all the individuals in the
population play the game once with all their neighbors,
compare payoff with them and decide the new strategy
for the next time step. Then, they all update their strat-
egy at once and their payoff is set to zero before the next
step. With the asynchronous update, an individual is
chosen at random. She and her neighbors play the game
once, each one with all her neighbors, so that they earn
the same payoff that they would have earned with a syn-
chronous update. Then, the chosen individual compares
payoff with her neighbors and updates her strategy ac-
cordingly. Finally, the payoff of all the individuals is set
to zero before the next time step.
The time of convergence in the simulations was T =
104 steps for synchronous update and T = N × 104 for
the asynchronous case (N is the population size). This
way the total number of update events is the same for
both schemes. If the population did not reach full coop-
eration or defection, an average of the cooperator den-
sity during the last tenth of the time evolution was used
to obtain the asymptotic cooperator density. Figure 10
shows that this time of convergence is enough to reach
a steady state, specially in the case of stochastic update
rules, which are much slower than the deterministic un-
conditional imitation rule. Notice that we have used a
much larger time of convergence than [35], which em-
ployed 48 time steps for a population size of 51 × 51.
We have found that, for population sizes like these ones,
times well over 103 steps are needed to ensure a correct
convergence, in agreement with many other works in the
field, like for example [16, 18, 23, 24, 28, 71]. Hauert
justified in [35] the choice of the time of convergence to
minimize finite-size effects, so the system did not become
aware of its finite dimensions. We disagree with this ar-
gument. Long times of convergence are typically needed
for Stag Hunt games near the transition between full co-
operation and full defection (see Fig. 10). In these cases,
clusters of cooperators may require a long time to grow
and occupy all the population. This means that in order
to reach the steady state interactions of the system with
its periodic images are unavoidable. On the other hand,
the influence of system size manifests itself as a lower or
greater probability of favorable configurations at initial
time, which can logically have an effect on the final out-
come (see Sec. V). So to actually determine finite-size
effects there is no other way to proceed but to increase
the size of the system. Reducing the evolution time only
introduces uncontrolled errors of lack of convergence.
The studied region in the ST -plane was sampled in
steps of 0.05. For each point in the resulting 41×41 grid,
which corresponds to a concrete game, 100 realizations
were performed to obtain a final average value for the
asymptotic density of cooperators. The mean coopera-
tion index for each game was calculated from the asymp-
totic values with the standard two-dimensional Simpson’s
quadrature rule [75].
Each realization started from a newly generated pop-
ulation, with strategies randomly assigned and the net-
work, when applicable, also randomly built. The ho-
mogeneous random networks were constructed directly,
assigning links randomly in the population, while ensur-
ing an equal number of links for every individual. All
the regular lattices were built with periodic boundary
conditions. Regular lattices of degrees k = 4 and k = 8
were built with two-dimensional square grids and, respec-
tively, von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods. Regular
lattices of degree k = 6 were built with two-dimensional
triangular grids and the 6 nearest neighbors.
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